Shekhar Gupta's column: In war, it is most important to be clear about your goals

On the 88th hour of Operation Sindoor, did India rush or show wisdom in accepting Pakistan's request for a ceasefire? Should India have continued the fight and for how long? Such questions emerged recently when a detailed report on the operation was released by a high-powered group for the Center for Military History and Perspective Studies, a Swiss institution. The findings of the report have been welcomed in India. The report said that India suffered only half of Pakistan's claims in air defense in this operation. More importantly, by the time the ceasefire was signed, the Indian Air Force had inflicted considerable damage on the enemy's air defence systems and the conflict was concluded with a series of heavy strikes on key bases of the Pakistan Air Force. In this way, by gaining a clear lead in the air strike, India forced Pakistan to plead for a ceasefire. The report has also stated that sufficient facts emerge to indicate that by the morning of 10th May 2025, the IAF had managed to dominate large parts of Pakistani airspace. This put him in a position to continue attacking the enemy's infrastructure from a long distance. The findings of this report seem to be more unbiased and clear than the reports from Western 'think tanks'. It also said that on the night of 6/7 May, the PAF was not successful in hindering or stopping India's attacks on Bahawalpur or Muridke. In such a situation, two questions immediately arise. One question that comes from the skeptics asks: Can you say that the IAF had dominated the airspace even though it was carrying out attacks from deep inside its own territory? Whereas the reality is that most wars today, especially air wars, are being fought from long distances and you don't even need to get close to the enemy's territory. The second and bigger question, which we have already raised, is whether India accepted the ceasefire much earlier? Many serious people also describe the ceasefire as a hasty decision and regret that the opportunity to teach Pakistan a lesson was lost. In response to this, the question can be raised that how would India define its victory and when would that victory have happened? What would have happened with the total destruction of the PAF? Or would it have been a victory if something like what happened in Dhaka in 1971 had happened? Since the evening of May 10, India has been saying that its goals had been achieved, it had achieved supremacy in the war and when to stop the war was in its hands. Any war must be defined specifically by the goals of the party starting it. This question was also raised by Atal Bihari Vajpayee when the deployment of the army on the borders under Operation Parakram was at its peak in January 2002. The mood of the country was completely hot and it was demanding an all-out fight. War is purely a political issue. This is neither an emotional affair, nor a purely military affair. Due to lack of clarity of goals, India was embroiled in Operation Parakram; The army was fully deployed and held out for ten months. Eventually, without doing anything, exhausted, she returned to the cantonments. Did India miss an opportunity then? In 1999 and 1971, we had set clear goals — liberating the territory under Pakistani occupation in Kargil and liberating Bangladesh. In 1999, Vajpayee did not bow down to the pressure from the army to extend the fight beyond the LoC. When Pakistan surrendered in the east in 1971, Indira Gandhi offered an immediate ceasefire in the Western Sector. In some circles, there is an eternal debate and regret that Indira did not "work" in the western sector. But the goals were clear in front of them and they declared victory after 13 days of fighting. War is such a serious matter, which cannot be left to the army generals. This decision should be left to politicians, who keep an eye on the big picture. As important as it is when to start a war, it is equally important to know when and how to end it. War is such a serious matter, which cannot be left to the army generals alone. (These are the author's own views)