Raghav Chandra's column: What is the use of an infrastructure built in a hurry that is not sustainable?

It is true that infrastructure has expanded on a large scale in the country. But the flaws that are constantly appearing in projects within a few days of their completion are a matter of concern. There have been many incidents of surface slippage, cracks, landslides and potholes in the Lucknow-Kanpur Expressway and Ganga Expressway, which were built with a huge budget and started recently. Earlier, the same thing happened in Delhi-Dehradun and Delhi-Mumbai Expressways. The economic loss caused by these incidents is in crores, but the lack of trust between the public and the government is much more severe. On the night of May 3, 2026, a 33-meter-long slab of Vikramshila Setu near Bhagalpur collapsed. The 4.7 km long bridge was divided into two parts, breaking the road-link between South and North Bihar. Until the Army and the BRO came together to build the Bailey Bridge, passengers had to take the 161-km-long alternative route and then take boats. Between 2022 and 2024, the bridge between Aguani and Sultanganj also collapsed three times. In May 2025, the project on the Ramanattukara-Valancherry stretch of NH-66 in Kerala was nearing completion when a reinforced earth wall collapsed. In August 2025, a 100-metre-long protection wall built a few months ago on the Chakki Bridge corridor between Himachal Pradesh and Punjab broke. Recently, a landslide between Thakurwadi and Monkey Hill in the Bhorghat section of the Central Railway (CR) caused heavy damage. A 50-60 metre railway line was washed away. 30 trains were cancelled. These are not unfortunate cases at isolated places. Lack of geotechnical investigations, ignoring ground-improvement measures, lack of adequate drainage arrangements, use of reinforced-soil wall technology in areas where it was not suitable – these are the flaws that can be attributed to these incidents. Another major reason is the fragmentation of the supervisory structure among the designers, companies, independent engineers and NHAI field staff that if something goes wrong, no one can be held responsible. Every rupee spent on rebuilding a wall, road or part of a bridge that should not have collapsed is what could have been used to build new infrastructure or repair existing structures. There are also a lot of indirect costs involved. For example, due to diversion, there is a delay in the movement of freight, the extra hours of the bridge reduces productivity and the work for which the bridges were built now has to be done by fishing boats. Since government tenders are awarded to the lowest bidder, the quality suffers. Contractors who get projects by bidding very low are left with only one way to make a profit — to test the material, land and cut down on construction work. Detailed project reports and ground assessments are the backbone of every project. But often they are made from the reports of previous projects. Only minor changes are made according to the geographical location of the new site, the water table or the history of the flood. The job of independent engineers is to catch these deficiencies before pouring concrete. But often they lack the experience or authority to stop the project. The design of reinforced walls and bridges should be examined. It should not be based on estimates of the general DPR, but on confirmed soil tests and at least a decade of monsoon and flood data. The most important thing besides other technological improvements is that we should stop taking pride in and glorifying the pace of infrastructure development. We must value quality over quantity, durability over appearance, and effectiveness over haste. (These are the author's own views)